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how the African-Brazilian movement approached its fight for racial
equality. We show how, traditionally, the African-Brazilian movement has
chosen the enactment of specific criminal statutes as the main legal strategy
in its movement against racial discrimination, and how it has judged the
effectiveness of this legislation in terms of the number of convictions made:
a low conviction rate has been interpreted as a sign of the courts' lack of
sensitivity concerning racial issues.
Secondly, we contrast the evaluation made by the social movement with
data collected from rulings made by the Sdo Paulo Court of Appeals (the
Tribunal de Justiqa do Estado de Sdo Paulo, or TJSP).1 Such data allows
us to prove that a lack of condemnations does not mean that the law is
ineffective or that judges are not sensitive to racial issues. The low number
of convictions for racism can be understood better in terms of incongruent
regulations rather than biased judges. Furthermore, the lack of convictions
does not necessarily mean that there are no court rulings against racist
behavior. Our research has shown that, on the contrary, most of the cases
brought before the TJSP have prompted judges to stress that racial
discrimination is illegal and should be taken to trial.
Therefore, Part III questions the inability of the African-Brazilian
movement to perceive how statutes are applied by the judiciary. We argue
that this inability is the result of a legalist vision of the application of norms
that does not allow social agents to thematize the moment of sentencing.
As a result, these social agents have failed to develop specific strategies to
present to the judiciary, which is regarded as being an activist judiciary.
The inability to discuss and develop a clear strategy to deal with this
problem has led the African-Brazilian movement to fight for new statutes,
which has in some cases served to perpetuate a situation characterized by
the low number of convictions.
We conclude by discussing the results of our research regarding the
importance to democracy of the dispute involved in the interpretation of
norms and, therefore, the importance of lawyers in a democracy. We will
show that a legalist position that defends the elimination of the
indeterminacy of legal norms can produce authoritarian practices, which, in
seeking to eliminate the dispute over the meaning of norms, favor the
creation of a single point of view about the meaning of laws.
1. Brazilian law is part of the civil-law tradition. The country has 27 state appeals
courts. For our case study, we chose to focus on the S~o Paulo Court of Appeals, which is
responsible for judging civil as well as criminal cases in one of the most populous states in
the country. Brazil has 183,987,291 inhabitants, and the state of S~o Paulo has 39,827,570
inhabitants. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATiSTICA (IBGE), CONTAGEM DA
POPULA ,O 2007 tbl.1.1 (2007), available at http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/
populacao/contagem2007/contagemfinal/tabelal_.pdf. The available data shows that, as
of 2005, 30.9% of the So Paulo population identified itself as being of African descent.
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I. THE CASE OF ANTIRACIST DEMANDS IN BRAZIL
A.

The History of the African-BrazilianMovement

Racism and how it is dealt with in the judicial sphere became an issue
after the Getulio Vargas dictatorship (1937-1945) because of the rise of
organizations and the influence of the press affiliated with the AfricanBrazilian movement, and because of demands made by the general public
for legal regulation on the subject, especially criminal legislation. 2 A
legislative turning point came with the issue of Law No. 1.390/51, known
as the Afonso Arinos Act, which made it an offense punishable by law to
refuse to serve or deny access in any way to a person based on skin color,
whether in a privately owned or public place.3 This was, without a doubt,
the most important legal instrument issued 4 until the subject resurfaced at
Brazil's ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) at the U.N. Convention in
1968. 5 From that moment on, Brazilian law made the incitement of hatred
or racial discrimination a crime against national security. 6 In civil
legislation, a significant breakthrough came with the Law of Public Civil
Action, which authorizes the Public Prosecutor's Office to defend ethnic
7
minorities through civil suits.
The legal perspective on racism underwent major changes in the
Constitution of 1988. African-Brazilian activists who made important
contributions in public forums shared considerable reservations about the
Afonso Arinos Act. These criticisms arose from the law's lack of
enforceability and what they perceived to be the main cause of the
problem-the way the law was drafted, namely the way conduct was
2. It is worth noting the contents of the Manifesto to the Brazilian Nation (Manifesto 6
Naqdo Brasileira), which resulted from the debates between 1945 and 1946 that were
instrumental to the National Convention of the Black Brazilian (Convenqdo Nacional do
Negro Brasileiro), expressly sought to pass an "anti-discriminatory law, with concrete
measures to make sure that the measure is not just an empty legal proclamation without any
real effect." Carmen Silvia Fullin, Direito e Racismo: Observaqres Sobre o Alcance da
Legislaqdo Penal Antidiscriminat6riano Brasil, in 6-I REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO
DE SAO BERNARDO DO CAMPO 21, 21 (2000) (translation provided by authors).
3. See Lei No. 1.390, de 03 dejulho de 1951, D.O.U. de 10.07.1951. (Brazil).
4. In addition to this law, there were legal statutes that broached the subject tangentially
by prohibiting broadcasting campaigns or discriminatory announcements: Lei No. 4.117, de
27 de agosto de 1962, D.O.U. de 05.10.1962. (Brazil) (law within the Brazilian
Telecommunications Code (C6digo Brasileiro de Telecomunicaq8es)); Lei No. 4.737, de 15
de julho de 1965, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 5: 62, jul. 1965 (law within the Brazilian
Electoral Code (Crdigo Eleitorao); Lei No. 5.250, de 9 de fevereiro de 1967, Col. Leis Rep.
Fed. Brasil, 1: 617, fev. 1967 (regulating freedom of expression and information).
5. EDWARD E. TELLES, RACE IN ANOTHER AMERICA: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SKIN COLOR

INBRAZIL 38 (2004).
6. Lei No. 6.620, de 17 de dezembro de 1978, D.O.U. de 20.12.1978. (Brazil).
7. See Lei No. 7.347, art. 1, § IV, de 24 de julho de 1985, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 5:
28, jul. 1985, as amended in C6DIGO CIVIL, CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL, C6DIGO
COMERCIAL, LEGISLACAO CIVIL, PROCESSUALCIVIL E EMPRESARIAL, CONSTITUI
1119 (10th ed. 2008) [hereinafter CODIGO CIVIL].

oOFEDERAL
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typified in very specific, detailed ways, making it difficult to characterize it
in practice. Criticisms were also leveled at the insufficient gravity of the
legal definition of discriminatory acts as misdemeanors, 8 rather than as
crimes per se. 9 In light of this, incisive demands were made to criminalize
such acts, and, in response, racism was made an "unbailable and
indefeasible crime," pursuant to article 5, section XLII of the Federal
Constitution of 1988.10 The new terms of the law made racism a serious
crime and sent a clear signal that punishment for the offense would be the
main means of addressing the problem of racial discrimination.
The federal legislation promulgated after this constitution focused on
regulating racism as a crime. To that end, the Ca6 Act (Law No. 7.716/89)
was passed, which established new crimes related to racial discrimination. "I
It referred to conduct addressed in the previous law's definition of
misdemeanors, but also added new conduct and increased the sentences
considerably: a simple prison sentence of three months to one year became
a one-to-three- or two-to-five-year sentence of confinement. 12
This was modified by Law Nos. 8.081/9013 and 8.882/94,14 which
created new types of criminal offenses, and later by Law No. 9.459/97.15
Law No. 9.459/97 was put forth by Representative Paulo Paim, whose

8. Within the Brazilian system, the distinction between a crime and a misdemeanor is
outlined in article 1 of the Law of Introduction to the Penal Code and the Law of
Misdemeanors, No. 3.914. In simple terms, a crime is a penal infraction that the law
punishes with reclusion and/or a fine. A misdemeanor is punished by the so-called simple
prison sentence (a less severe prison regime, more likely to be converted into an open prison
regime, for instance) and/or a fine, administered in conjunction in some cases. Although the
main difference lies in the type of sanction applied, a difference in the seriousness of the
offense is implied. Decreto Lei No. 3.914, de 9 de dezembro de 1941, Col. Leis Rep. Fed.
Brasil, 7: 612, dez. 1941.
9. In 1983, as a result of the second black cultural week, the National Congress of
Brazil debated Draft Legislation No. 1661, which foresaw the "criminalization" of racial
discrimination and its typification in a wider sense. See, e.g., Statement of Abdias
Nascimiento, DIARIO DO CONGRESSO NACIONAL-SECAO 1 6473 (julho 1983); see also
EUNICE APARECIDA DE JESUS PRUDENTE, PRECONCEITO RACIAL E IGUALDADE JURiDICA NO
BRASIL: A CIDADANIA NEGRA EM QUESTAO 243-44, 257 (1989). The draft was rejected, but
some of the demands were taken into consideration in later legislative reforms, which we
describe below. See, e.g., Constituiq;o Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. V, § XLII (1988)
(Braz.); Lei No. 7.716, de 5 de janeiro de 1989, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 181 (1): 10-11,
jan. 1989; Lei No. 9.459, de 13 de maio de 1997, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 189 (5): 277375, mai. 1997.
10. Constituiqdo Federal [C.F.] art. V, § XLII (1988) (Braz.).
11. Lei No. 7.716, de 5 de janeiro de 1989, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 181 (1): 10-11,
jan. 1989.
12. Id.
13. Lei No. 8.081, de 21 de setembro de 1990, Lex, 1087, set. 1990 (Braz.).
14. Lei No. 8.882, de 3 de junho de 1994, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 186 (7): 2420, jun.
1994.
15. Lei No. 9.459, de 13 de maio de 1997, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 189 (5): 2773-75,
mai. 1997.
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primary concern, as
outlined in the justification of his project, was to
"attack impunity."' 6
The most important decisions concern the changes introduced in article
20 of Law No. 7.716 of 1989; instead of outlining behavior and assigning
detailed descriptions, it supplies a generic characterization of the crime of
racism, described as "practicing, inducing or inciting discrimination or
prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, religion or nationality". 7
Secondly, the law added to article 140 of the penal code a more serious
form of slander, with a sentence of one to three years confinement plus a
fine, "if the grievance derives from affronts to race, color, ethnicity, religion
18
or origin."'
According to the draft of the statute presented before the National
Congress of Brazil, this last device aimed to correct one of the issues that
adversely affected the application of the previous law: the fact that the
courts continued to consider instances of slander with racist content to be
simple crimes against honor, with punishments less severe than those for
racism. This change also meant that the offended parties had to bring the
cases. Unlike cases commenced by the state, suits brought by private
individuals are subject to a series of limitations: procedural rules are
extremely strict, suits must be brought within six months, and they involve
considerable costs-such as those for retaining and paying for personal
legal representation.
It is worth noting that the original draft legislation included racial slander
as part of the Ca6 Act, making clear a concern, present in the justification of
the proposal of the new statute, that racial slander should be considered a
"racial crime." 19 Apparently it was also intended that such cases not be
tried in courts through private individual initiative. Nevertheless, the
wording of the final version of the statute established that these behaviors
would not be an autonomous part of the Ca6 Act, and would instead be
deemed simply a more serious form of slander by article 140, section 3 of
the Brazilian Penal Code. 20 The crime would be subject to a smaller
sentence than the one outlined in the draft and tried according to the same
procedure as every other crime against subjective honor-that is, through
private, individual initiative. In the end, the draft was unable to sort out the
problems that had been put in place through privately sponsored cases. The
distinction between racism and racial slander and their respective
submission to different legal procedures is, as we shall see, a factor that has
16. See Projeto de Lei No. 1.240, art. 21, de 21 de novembro de 1995, Didrio da CAmara
dos Deputados, 163: 24,632, set. 1996 (Braz.).
17. Lei No. 7.716, de 5 de janeiro de 1989, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 181 (1): 11, jan.
1989.
18. Lei No. 9.459, de 13 de maio de 1997, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 189 (5): 2774,
mai. 1997.
19. See Projeto de Lei No. 1.240, de 21 de novembro de 1995, Di6.rio da Camara dos
Deputados, 163: 24,632, set. 1996 (Braz.).
20. Decreto No. 2.848, art. 140, § 3, de 7 de dezembro de 1940, D.O.U. de 31.12.1940.
(Brazil), as amended in CODIGO CIVIL, supra note 7, at 253, 282.
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considerable consequences for the application of this law. Research that we
have carried out thus far has not offered any insight into why the draft of
the statute was changed.
Until recently, it is easy to see that the African-Brazilian movement
centered its legislative efforts on strategies that increased, toughened, or
perfected the criminalization of discriminatory and prejudicial acts. To a
large extent, the legislative powers conceded to the movement's demands.
As a result, Brazil's antiracist legislation today is characterized by strong,
commanding, and coercive language and, for the most part, by the
application of strong penal measures. 2 1 Despite this trend, discussions
about other types of intervention and legal action have only recently gained
importance with the advent of rhetoric focusing on affirmative measures.
It was only through mobilizations originating from Brazil's participation
in the 2001 Racism Conference organized by the UN in Durban that
governmental agencies and legislatures began to publicly discuss an
22
antiracist platform based on affirmative action policies.
Such a discussion coincides with a generation of critical reflectionsboth in academic circles and within the African-Brazilian movement
itself-regarding the lack of appropriate measures to deal with racism,
arguing in favor of using other legal measures to eliminate social inequality
motivated by racism. 23 The theme of affirmative action was brought to the
Congress with considerable emphasis on the discussion about the law on
social and racial quotas in federal and state universities. 2 4 These projects
21. The punitive solution had prominence as a way to assign social relevance to the
problem of racism. The demands to criminalize racism and issue severe sentences
correspond to a vision in which the larger the sentence, the greater the degree of social
relevance attributed to the infraction. See Fullin, supra note 2.
22. Examples of these measures include the adoption by several ministries of the system
of assigned places for black employees; the implementation in May 2002 of the Affirmative
Action Program, which sought to increase black, female, and handicapped employment in
federal management positions; and the institution of a system of preferential treatment in
some universities. Furthermore, the Supreme Tribunal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal)
approved the constitutionality of affirmative action, and some tribunals started to adopt
obligatory measures to establish a minimum number of black employees in companies
outsourced by the justice system.

LUCIANA DE BARROS JACCOUD & NATHALIE BEGHIN,
DESIGUALDADES RACIAIS NO BRASIL: UM BALANIO DA INTERVENC;AO GOVERNAMENTAL 22-

23 (2002).
23. Id. at 18; Fullin, supra note 2, at 34; Joaquim B. Barbosa Gomes, 0 Ministgrio
Pfblico e os Efeitos da Discriminaqdo Racial no Brasil: Da Indiferen~a 6 In~rcia,in II- 15
BOLETIM DOS PROCURADORES DA REPOBLICA 15-25 (1999); S6rgio Salomao Shecaira,
Racismo, in ESCRITOS EM HOMENAGEM A ALBERTO SILVA FRANCO 401, 416-18 (Revista dos
Tribunais 2003).
24. It was brought to Congress through Draft Legislation No. 73/99 signed by
Representative Nice Lob~o, with its diverse amendments and attachments. Draft Legislation
No. 73/99 is currently under review by the Senate after it was reviewed by the House of
Representatives. Additionally, there is the Statute for Racial Equality (Draft Legislation No.
213/03), signed by Senator Paulo Paim, which has been under review at the National
Congress since 1998. See Projecto de Lei No. 75, de 1999, Di6.rio da Camara dos Deputados,
09,546-47 (Braz.); Projecto de Lei No. 213, de 2003, Di.rio do Senado Federal, 13,459-70
(Braz.).
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focus on the establishment of a series of affirmative action that involves
"special programs and measures adopted by the state to correct racial
inequalities and the promotion of equal opportunity. ' 2 5 This changes the
focus from legislative policies that vetoed behavior under threat of sanction
to policies centered on the establishment of a series of positive measures
adopted by the State, aimed at correcting distortions and inequalities, and
assuring "equal rights for African-Brazilians in the country's economic,
26
social, political and cultural life."
B. The Diagnosticof the Inefficiency of the Law and Its CritiqueBased on
TJSP Data

We can assume that there is a common discourse, both on behalf of the
social movements and a significant part of the legal community, that the
antiracist legislation is "ineffective"-that it has not been applied as
extensively within the judiciary as had been hoped, 27 seeing as there have
been almost no criminal condemnations. 2 8 Included in this diagnosis is a
25. Projecto de Lei No. 213, de 29 de maio de 2003, Dirio do Senado Federal, 13,459
(Braz.) (translation provided by authors).
26. More specifically, article 4 of Draft Legislation No. 213/03 states that:
equal rights for African-Brazilians in the country's economic, social, political and
cultural life shall be guaranteed in the followings ways:
I - inclusion of racial issues in social and economic development public
policies;
II - adoption of affirmative measures, programs and policies;
III - modification of state-wide institutional structures to ensure adequate
procedures to deal with and overcome racial inequality resulting from prejudice
and racial discrimination;
IV - advancement of normative measures to combat racial discrimination in all
its structural, institutional and individual manifestations;
V - elimination of historical, socio-cultural and institutional obstacles that
thwart the representation of racial diversity in the public and private sphere;
VI - stimulus, support and strengthening of civil society initiatives directed
towards the promotion of equal opportunities and the fight against racial
inequality, including the implementation of incentives and criteria to condition and
prioritize access to public resources and contracts;
VII - the implementation of affirmative action programs destined to combat
racial inequality in such sectors as education, culture, sport and leisure, health,
work, media, land rites (especially land associated with slaves and their
descendents), access to Justice, public financing, outsourcing and tendering.
. . . Affirmative action shall be activated immediately through reparatory
initiatives destined to initiate the correction of racial inequalities and distortions
derived from slavery and other discriminatory and racist practices adopted, in the
public and private sphere, throughout Brazil's social formation and make use of
the quotas system to reach the required objectives.
Id. at 13,459-60 (translation provided by authors).
27. Irahy Baptista de Abreu, 0 Racismo e a Jurisprud6nciado Egr~gio Tribunal de
Justiqa do Estado de Sjo Paulo, in JAQUES DE CAMARGO PENTEADO, 6 JUSTICA PENAL 306,
306-09 (Revista dos Tribunais 1999).
28. Flvia Piovesan & Luis Carlos Rocha Guimares, Convengdo Sobre a Eliminaqdo de
Todas as Formas de Discriminaqdo Racial, in DIREITOS HUMANOS: CONSTRUl AO DA
LIBERDADE E DA IGUALDADE 353-68 (Centro de Estudos da Procuradoria do Estado de Sao

Paulo 1998).
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series of elements that make up a system of filters and obstacles impeding
the processing of demands associated with the issue (which involve all sorts
of difficulties in getting access to the judiciary, as well as a lack of legal
representation, the absence of police authorities, the inertia of the
prosecutor, etc.). As far as the judiciary goes, frequent remarks are made
about judges who are impermeable or insensitive to the problem of racism.
In the words of an important African-Brazilian activist, "[T]he judge's free
interpretation of facts is generally influenced by social theories that
undervalue the gravity of racist violence-both in real and symbolic
terms-turning racial relations into a carnival and feeding into an ideology

29
of racial democracy."
Data gathered at TJSP using rulings from 1998 to 2007 allow for the
diagnosis to be seen in relative terms. 30 A search in the TJSP data bank for
rulings related to racism was carried out using the databases available at the
Lawyers' Association of Sdo Paulo (the Associaqdo dos Advogados de Sio
Paulo, or AASP) 3 1 and at the TJSP 32 with updates that run through
December 2007. The search used the keywords "racismo" (racism);
"injtiria qualificada"(serious slander); "injtiria racial" (racial slander); and
"discriminagdo racial" (racial discrimination), and came back with 1275
rulings. Manual searches discarded nonpenal rulings, as well as cases that
debated exclusively procedural or incidental matters, leaving 116 court
decisions. Qualitative analyses revealed that 5 of those 116 cases
constituted discrimination cases based on the plaintiff's nationality
(German and Portuguese) or religion (Jewish and Islamic) and therefore
were excluded from our research.
For the remaining 111 decisions made between 1998 and 2007, there
were: 40 criminal appeals; 25 criminal interlocutory appeals (recursos em
sentido estrito); 20 writs of habeas corpus; 18 private criminal actions
(queixas-crime); 3 appeals against decisions on habeas corpus; 2 atypical
proceedings involving petitions to prosecute public officers; 2 criminal
actions conducted solely by the appeal court (special jurisdictions); and 1
prejudicial appeal arguing the nonimpartiality of the judge (exceqdo de
suspeiqdo).
As shown in Figure 1, most of these cases (45 in total) reached the court
after the announcement of the judgment of merit (condemning or absolving)

29. OBSERVATrRIO NEGRO, PARECER DO PROJETO DE LEI DO SENADO NO. 309 DE 2004, at

13
(2006),
available at
Observatorio-Negro-PE.pdf.

http://www.leliagonzalez.org.br/material/ParecerPLS309_

30. For an analysis of the TJSP cases, we used data gathered by Marta Machado, A
Legislaqdo Anti-racismo no Brasil e Sua Aplicaqdo: Um Caso de Insensibilidade do
Judicirio?,74 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CINCIAS CRIMINALS (forthcoming 2009).
31. Associaqgo dos Advogados de Sdo Paulo, http://www.aasp.org.br (last visited Feb.

27, 2009). The website of the Lawyers' Association of Sdo Paulo has a private database
only for associates; it is not possible to enter without a membership identification and a
password.
32. Tribunal de Justiqa do Estado de S~o Paulo, Portal de Serviqos e-SAJ,
http://esaj.tj.sp.gov.br/cjsg/consultaCompleta.do (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
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in the first instance. A significant number of cases (40) were tried in court
after the judge's initial ruling that rejected the complaint or extinguished
punishability, thwarting the continuation of the case. Twelve cases were
taken to court before criminal action began and 14 of them while criminal
action was underway.
Figure 1: TJSP Cases Relatedto Racism, 1998-2007:
Phase of Criminal Procedure When Case Brought to Appeal Court ofSio
Paulo

During Preliminary Police Inquiry

9

Before Conn-encenent of Criminal Action

31

After Judge's Denial to Connnence Criminal
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!

After Judge's Decision to Comnence Criminal
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After Acquittal
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After Conviction / Sentencing
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As for TJSP rulings, if we only take into consideration the decisions that
analyzed the merits of the case-either acquitting or convicting the suspect
(41 in total)-it becomes evident that the court condemned more than it
absolved: 25 condemnations compared with 16 absolutions. As for
procedural outcomes and annulments, the number of cases closed (based on
rejection of charges, extinction of punishability, dismissal or annulment of
the case), compared with those that were sent to trial are as follows: 38
decisions of the former compared with 29 of the later, which represents
34.3% compared to 26.1%, respectively.
Taking into consideration all Il1 cases (that is, condemnations and
absolutions, as well as decisions to proceed, dismiss, or annul cases) we
notice a prevalence of cases in which a decision was taken to end a case
prematurely (38 cases in total, including rejections, extinction of
punishability, dismissal, or annulment of the case). In other words, this is
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the most common outcome for cases that reach the TJSP. Following this,
there are 29 cases that were sent for trial and a total of 25 condemnations
and 16 absolutions. This data is reflected in Figure 2.
Figure 2: TJSP Cases Related to Racism, 1998-2007:
Nature of the Decision

Nullified Suit J)
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Condemnations, as indicated in Figure 3, primarily were for slander
(plain slander or racial slander), with or without sentencing increases. We
located only one condemnation for racism in accordance with article 20 of
Law No. 7.716/89 and one condemnation through article 4 of the same law
33
based on the denial or obstruction of employment.
As for the sentences applied, 12 of the 25 condemnations established 1
year in prison and a fine of 10 days, which corresponds to the minimum
sentence for serious slander. In 6 cases, the sentence was fixed at 16
months, which corresponds to the minimum legal limit for higher degree
slander with a one-third increase based on circumstances from article 141 of
33. T.J.S.P-4, Ap. No. 202.256-3/1/00, Relator: Des. Leite, 04.03.1998, available at

http://esaj.tj.sp.gov.br/cjsg/resultadoSimples.do (Brazil) (condemnation through art. 20 of
Law No. 7.716/89); T.J.S.P-5, Ap. No. 313.895-3/1/00, Relator: Des. Braga, 11.08.2004,

available at http://esaj.tj.sp.gov.br/cjsg/resultadoSimples.do (Brazil) (condemnation through
art. 4 of Law No. 7.716/89).
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the penal code.
The largest sentence found was for two years'
imprisonment, set by the court on 3 occasions. In many cases, penalties of
imprisonment were replaced with community service. 34 In 2 cases, the
condemnations were followed by the extinction of the penalty (extinqdo da
35

pretensdo execut6ria da pena).

Fi2ure 3: TJSP Cases Related to Racism, 1998-2007:
Number of and Grounds for Convictions
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Law No. 7.716/89, art. 4: Denying Job
Law No. 7.716/89, art. 20: Racism
Penal Code art. 140: Simple Slander
Penal Code art. 140, § 3: Racial Slander
Penal Code art. 140 & art. 140, § 3: Racial Slander & Simple Slander
Penal Code art. 140, § 3 & art. 61, 11,a: Racial Slander, AggravatedFutile Reason
(g): Penal Code art. 140, § 3 & Art. 141, II: Racial Slander, AggravatedAgainst a Public Officer
(h): Penal Code art. 140, § 3 & Art. 141, 111: Racial Slander, AggravatedIn the Presence of Many People or with Media Exposure

Figure 4 breaks down the cases that ended in acquittals. Acquittals were
justified in half of the cases (8 of 16) based on a lack of evidence. In only 6
of the cases involving acquittals did the judges analyze the merits of the
case and make rulings based on the lack of crime. Within this set, the
argument that the offender did not act with harmful intent, or in bad faith, is
34. According to article 44 of the Brazilian Penal Code, it is possible to replace penalties
of imprisonment up to four years with so-called "alternative penalties," such as community
service.
35. These cases were calculated as condemnations because we deem it relevant that the
procedure came to an end and reached a legal conclusion that recognized the perpetrator's
responsibility and wrongdoing.
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significant. This happened even though the court admitted that racial
offenses took place.
In a significant number of the cases analyzed (38 cases), the court
decided on an early closure of the case-opting for a rejection of the
nullifying or dismissing the suit, or extinguishing
charges pressed,
36
punishability.
Fleure 4: TJSP Cases Relatedto Racism, 1998-2007:
Number of and Grounds for Acquittals
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As demonstrated in Figure 5, the most common reason for this outcome
(12 cases) is the disagreement in court over how to define the case legallywhether as racism, simple slander, or racial slander. In 5 cases, the
disagreements in relation to the judicial interpretation of the kind of attacks
proffered resulted in a rejection of the charges filed. In 7 cases, it resulted
in the extinction of the possibility that the defendant could be punished by
the state due to the plaintiffs lack of timeliness in filing the initial charge
for racial slander. Therefore, about 10% of cases have been withdrawn for
this reason.
In these 12 cases, the court in its decisions reevaluated the previous
judicial definition of the crimes as racism, establishing that the crimes at
issue should be considered slander or racial slander. Defining a set of facts
as slander or racial slander rather than as racism often has the practical
36. We state above that the two cases that failed to administer punishment after ruling to
condemn were in fact counted as condemnations and not put into this group. See supra note
35 and accompanying text.
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effect of the dismissal of the case for lack of timeliness in the filing of the
initial charge. This happens because of the different manners in which each
type of case is processed: racism is tried through a public penal trial; in
other words, it is tried by an executive of the state-in this case, the State
Prosecutor (Minist&io Ptblico). Racial injury-such as racial slander-is
tried through private action by an offended party who seeks a lawyer and
has six months from the time she learns the identity of the perpetrator to file
suit.
Feure 5: TJSP Cases Relatedto Racism, 1998-2007:
Number of and Grounds for Cases Terminated Before Reaching the
Merits
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The different procedures for these crimes outline a problematic situation:
every time racism is redefined as racial slander after the six-month deadline
mentioned above, the offended party will no longer be able to initiate the
required procedure. Even if the statute of limitations has not yet expired,
the decision may be handed down so late in the process that the offended
party barely has time to bring together a penal case.
The second most relevant cause for the premature termination of cases
was a lack of evidence. This factor ruled out 10 private criminal actions
and grounded the dismissal of a criminal action. Most of the cases simply
provided a police report, which was deemed insufficient to justify a penal
action. In general, the question of proof was significant to the outcome of
almost all of these cases. In addition to the cases in which lack of evidence
was the sole reason for the termination of the case, it was a decisive factor
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in half of the cases that ended with acquittal. In other words, the lack of
proof was dispositive in the termination and absolution of 19 cases.
Also significant was the termination of 8 cases before or during the
hearing because of failure to comply with an established formality
associated with private criminal actions. As mentioned above, privately
sponsored criminal cases are subject to stricter controls, and, as a result, any
faults perpetrated by the accuser during the trial end up drawing the case to
a close.
The data presented allows us to question the diagnosis of insensibility
attributed to TJSP when dealing with racial discrimination. It throws light
on the dynamics of the penal system, which can help one to correct its
shortcomings. The perception that there are no convictions was not upheld,
at least in terms of the TJSP. Overall, the number of convictions reached
approximately 22.5% (or 25 rulings), which is significant. These were
convictions for racial slander. What seems troublesome and frustrating
from the point of view of the judicial system output is the many cases (38)
in which trials ended before the judge declared a sentence. This number is
not only greater than the number of cases in which the court proceeded with
the case (26), but also represents the most common outcome of the cases
tried by TJSP-34% of the total cases analyzed.
To understand these results, one must be sensitive to the inner workings
of the country's legal system, and more specifically, to the dynamic of the
application of criminal and procedural rules. The main questions to
consider relate to the problem of changing the classification of racial cases
and recognizing a lack of timeliness. The lack of mechanisms to instruct
private accusers of the proof that must be presented-especially when the
suit is filed-and the failure to comply with the protocols and formalities of
privately sponsored cases are significant factors in the dismissal of
numerous cases.
First, the disagreement over the classification of cases of personal
affronts involving a racist element is one of the most debated legal issues
associated with this subject. As we have outlined above, this dispute results
in the termination of many criminal actions. Critically, we must not
presume that this termination is the desired result of judges when they call
for the case to be reassessed-especially because the classification of cases
brought about by insults of a racial type, such as racial slander, is justifiable
from a legal point of view.
The question of judicial qualification of the facts is not that simple.
Before the changes were made to Law No. 9.459/97, insults that contained
racist elements frequently were classified as plain slander by the courts.
The classification was criticized, however, because it resulted in low
sentences: the crime of plain slander carried a sentence of one to six
months or a fine, typically was tried through private avenues, and was
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viewed by the law as an affront to individual honor instead of racist
37
conduct.
In order to correct this conflict about the application of norms, Law No.
9.459/97 created a more serious form of slander: racial slander. The penalty
for this behavior is significantly higher; Law No. 9.459/97 increased the
penalty from one to six months of detention and a monetary fine to one to
three years of confinement and a fine. The increased sentence is premised
solely on the conduct having a racial component. 38 This new form of
slander, "which uses elements that refer to race, color, ethnicity, religion,
origin or someone's age or physical impairment" 39 contemplated both the
worthlessness of the conduct in terms of how it affects individual honor, as
well as the discriminatory character of the conduct in terms of how it insults
a group of people based on race. The new law attempted to eliminate
disputes over interpretation, but left the procedural problems unaltered.
Therefore, racial slander must be tried through private penal actions.
The fight over the legal classification of the crime continues well after
the aforementioned change in legislation. It is possible to hold that the
generic crime of racism consisting of "practicing, inducing or inciting
discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, religion or
national origin" can include a racial slander. 40 In other words, an offense
that implicates racial elements can be considered a type of racism. This
stance relies on the plain meaning of the verbs in the statute to defend the
possibility of increasing its reach through the assimilation of a series of
behaviors associated with the words "to discriminate." Or better still, it can
also be stated that the accomplishment of the two crimes simultaneously by
one single action should be recognized. Rebecca Duarte, a lawyer and
activist of the African-Brazilian movement, interprets the concept "to
discriminate" 4 1 as keeping with the definition produced by ICERD, ratified
by Brazil in 1968.42 According to Rebeca Duarte, "offensive jargons such
as 'damn nigger,' among others, for example, not only distinguish, but
characterize the person offensively, not only as an individual, but as

37. See supra Part I.A.
38. Lei No. 9.459, art. 2, de 13 de maio de 1999, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 189 (5):
2774, mai 1997.
39. Decreto Lei No. 2.848, art. 140, § 3, de 7 de dezembro de 1940, D.O.U. de

31.12.1940. (Brazil), as amended in CODIGO

CIVIL, supra note 7, at 253, 282.
40. REBECA OLIVEIRA DUARTE, SOS RACiSMO, PRATICA DO RACISMO E APLICACAO DA

LEI: CONTRIBUICkO A ANALISE DA LEGISLACAO ANTIDISCRIMINATORIA 5 (2003).

41. Id. at 1.
42. According to this text, "to discriminate" signifies all
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field
of public life.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1,
G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965), available at http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/law/pdf/cerd.pdf.
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belonging to a specific racial group, inhibiting the black population of the
fundamental right to their racial identity, free of discriminatory names and
comparisons." 4 3 And so, the apparent conflict of norms between racial
slander and racism should be resolved by accepting the simultaneous
incidence of both crimes because the perpetrator of the crime, in one fell
derogatory idea with
swoop, targets personal honor and also "associates the
44
the racial/ethnic group the insulted party belongs to."
The generality/specificity dichotomy inherent within these norms brings
into question whether it is possible to recognize their simultaneous
incidence. Racial slander can be understood as a more specific kind of
crime than both plain slander and racism. In comparison to slander, it has
the addition of the racist element. In comparison to racism, there exists a
special requirement that the discriminatory practice be concomitant with an
offense to one's honor. Keeping in mind that considering racial slander as a
special kind of offense determines that the more general rule cannot be
applied, the compliance with this principle eschews simultaneous
condemnation for both crimes in favor of only racial slander.
Another principle of penal law could be called upon to challenge this
opinion: the concept of ne bis in idem, that is, the ban on condemning or
worsening the defendant's situation two or more times for the same fact. In
this case, the racist element as manifested in the conduct is tried twice:
first, to aggravate ordinary slander so that it is then interpreted to fall within
the more serious category of racial slander, and second, to constitute racial
discrimination, a central element to the crime in article 20 of Law No.
7.716/89.
In sum, one must recognize that different interpretations are possible, and
that the defense of the thesis that two crimes are accomplished
simultaneously by one action is, in accordance with the positive legal
system and rules for interpreting penal laws, as plausible as defending the
classification as racial injury.
There are intrinsic elements to the system of legal argumentation that
show that the court's classification of this type of conduct as racial slander,
although far from being the only form of legal dogmatics interpretation, can
be considered plausible. The dispute over how to interpret facts and apply
the law by means of legal dogmatic debate is to be expected. To discuss the
application of statutes without considering the indeterminacy of legal norms
and the room for dogmatic argumentation would be a mistake. It seems
evident in these cases that the judge applying the law must be familiar with
a whole range of categories (such as "racism," "racial discrimination,"
"racial slander," the principle of legality, the principle of speciality, etc.),
henceforth increasing the range of interpretations, and the indetermination
45
of norms.
43. See DUARTE, supra note 40, at 2-3 (translation provided by authors).
44. Id. at 5-6 (translation provided by authors).
45. The conclusion of this essay provides a more detailed discussion on interpretation
and indetermination in law.
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The main reason for the premature termination of cases was the different
procedural regimes involved in the dispute. In reading and assessing these
cases, one must consider the legal dogmatics problem inherent in the
competition between the two definitions that can be adopted from the facts
("racial slander" and "racism") and the paradoxical procedural rules applied
to the problem-namely, that the recognition of a new classification
subjects the case to new procedures that harken back to a preceding moment
and end up suppressing rights. In other words, the offended party is
required to have taken measures that were not necessary at the outset, due to
a change in legal requirements, under threat of seeing the case dismissed.
The rule that determines the six-month deadline from the moment the
perpetrator's identity is disclosed is a determining factor in the problematic
results found. The difficulty in accepting solutions that escape the
application of this penal procedural rule, which has no legally established
exceptions, shows us that, when it comes to this point, we are facing a
systematic problem that would be better resolved by means of a change in
legislation calling for the crime of racial injury to be tried by means of a
criminal procedure commenced by the district attorney, which is not
46
subjected to the problems related to private, criminal action procedure.
This change would also help avoid the procedural problems faced by
privately sought penal cases-problems of access to justice, difficulties
arising from briefing, and questions involving how to comply with the
stricter rules involving the submission of a criminal action-which
prompted the closure of eight cases in the data above.
Additionally, as we already have mentioned, most of the dismissals and
acquittals were due to a lack of evidence. The relevance of this problem,
which was revealed by the data collected, also specifically was mentioned
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its 1997 report
about human rights in Brazil, which stated,
[L]aw 7,716 has proved difficult to enforce since it [does not] establish[]
mechanisms to facilitate proof that a crime has been committed.
Moreover, by making it necessary to prove that discrimination was
intended leads to situations in which the aggressor and the aggrieved
must
confront one another and the offense must be proved objectively. 47

46. Draft legislation No. 309 issued by the Senate addresses this matter. See Projecto de
Lei No. 309, art. 4, de novembro de 2004, Didrio do Senado Federal, quinta-feira 4, 34,708
(Braz.).
47. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Brazil, ch. IX,

15,

OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97, doc. 29 rev. 1 (Sept. 29, 1997). Note that, within this paragraph of the
report, the Portuguese and English versions differ: the English version reads "it establishes
mechanisms," whereas the Portuguese version, when translated into English, reads "it does
not establish mechanisms." Compare Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.
Chapter 9 - Country Report on Brazil, http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/brazil-eng/
Chaper/o209%20.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009), with Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, Capitulo 9 - Country Report on Brazil, http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/
brazil-port/Cap%209%20.htm#LegislaC3%A7%C3%A3o (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). We
have quoted the available English version with corrective alterations.
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Proper critique of the suitability or lack thereof in these rulings can be
made only after a qualitative appraisal of these cases, taking into
consideration the principle of the judge's freedom to evaluate evidence. As
difficult as it is to evaluate cases that involve intersubjective insults that are
hard to prove, the number of dismissals and acquittals due to lack of
evidence points to the need to reevaluate legal institutions and the way they
deal with racism in court.
This matter is certainly worth examining. We do not know, for example,
if the difficulties over proof arise from poorly briefed cases (which can be
corrected through measures that improve the quality of legal services and
the quality of police investigations and guidance), the out-of-date doctrine
(which sees in the category of "criminal intent" a need for proof of a
psychological order and, hence, the necessity to vie for the prevalence of
another mode of understanding the elements that comprise the notion of
crime), "excess demand" on the court's behalf or some sort of
predisposition to absolve (which should certainly be the object of
democratic and critical control, but which can only be confirmed through
empirical analyses), or the fact that most of the cases depend on personal
evidence.
It is evident that the premature termination of the cases is not the kind of
response expected from the social movements or affected parties who
submit their demands to the legal system. But there are a whole series of
possible explanations for the termination of these cases; these statistics
cannot be reduced to the unproven thesis that the legal system is
impermeable to racism cases, or that it is somehow acting in an ideological
manner and has an interest in undermining antiracist legislation.
All in all, the number of cases in which the court orders a trial or issues a
condemnation is more or less equivalent to the number of cases in which it
terminates the criminal action or absolves. In other words, within the
universe analyzed, there is a reasonable amount of recognition that racist
practices are illegal and should be persecuted and condemned.
In fact, rulings exist that describe racist attacks as "archaic slang, devoid
of racist content" or "destitute of any pejorative meaning," in cases in
which neither the event itself, nor the identity of the perpetrator were being
questioned. It is only in the context of these cases that one can state firmly
that the judge trying the case is insensitive to racial conflict. However,
these cases occur on a much smaller scale: in six cases of acquittal and in
three cases of annulment of the case. These cases represent only 8.1% of
cases.
II. CREATION AND APPLICATION OF LAWS IN THE JURIDIFICATION OF
SOCIAL DEMANDS

The African-Brazilian movement's vindications of specific laws that
criminalize racism have given little importance to the internal dynamics of
the judiciary. The articulated defenses of theses about the interpretation of
laws or a specific strategy that understands the judiciary as a sphere where
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legal norms are hotly debated are not central to the movement's discourse.
The African-Brazilian movement does not have among its core fighting
strategies one that takes into consideration the autonomy of the judiciary in
relation to the text of the statute.48 In failing to recognize this, its discourse
seems to operate on the supposition that a perfect coincidence can be
attained between the written law and the result of its application, which we
can describe as "legalist." Such a position is characterized by not focusing
their discourse on the dispute of the meaning of the rules-that is, a
discourse addressed to the authority applying the law.
We differentiate between a legalist and a literal point of view. The latter
is characterized by literal interpretation of the laws, or rather, by adhering
closely to the text, avoiding an interpretation that takes into consideration
substantive objectives aimed at the norm and its application context. 4 9 A
stance such as this leaves room for interpretation, but maintains that, in
certain cases (or in most of them), in keeping with the fundamental
principle of legal certainty, judges must come as close as possible to
sentencing in accordance with the literal sense of the text. We describe the
African-Brazilian movement's stance as legalist because we do not identify
in its core strategy an articulated and specific discourse aimed at an attempt
to argue about the meaning within the judiciary, not even to stand by
eventual literal interpretations. Such a strategy is based on the fight for
antiracist laws, but does not address the application of the law as a relevant
moment.
The dominant legalist discourse of the African-Brazilian movement
seems to rule out the development of a strategy to debate the meaning of
statutes that does not expressly and specifically address racial issues.
Brazilian law offers another path for the trial of racist acts in the legislation
drafted on civil responsibility. This exemplifies a sanctioning regulationalbeit a civil one-though not specifically aimed at the sanction of racism.
Research carried out in the TJSP database 50 showed that there are victims
of racism, although not yet very numerous, who are seeking this path. This
48. A contemporary formulation of the independence of the moment in which judicial
norms are applied is discussed in KLAUS GONTHER, THE SENSE OF APPROPRIATENESS:
APPLICATION DISCOURSES INMORALITY AND LAW (John Farrell trans., State Univ. of N.Y.
1993). The classic formulation of the theme is in HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans.,
1992) (1932).
49. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin '": Formalism in Law and
Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 530 (1999); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988); Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation,42 SAN DIEGO L. REv 607, 614
(2005).
50. For the analysis of court rulings in civil responsibility suits, we performed
exploratory research on the TJSP database. We did not carry out a complete search;
therefore, regarding this point, we cannot make any quantitative statement. See Tribunal de
Justiea do Estado de Sio Paulo, Portal de Servi~os e-SAJ, http://esaj.tj.sp.gov.br/
cjsg/consultaCompleta.do (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). Even though it is still not conclusive
from a quantitative point of view, we feel it can already offer some interesting qualitative
points for reflection on the question of how racism may be dealt with within the Brazilian
legal system.
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constitutes a typical strategy of involvement in the process of the
application of a legal norm-that is, of the juridification of the demands for
racial justice by means of the dispute over the meaning that should be
attributed to norms in the legal system.
It is worth noting that if drawing on this strategy presents the typical
problems associated with the interpretation of norms, it also presents some
advantages when compared to Brazilian criminal law.
First, civil
responsibility does not require the proof of the intention to cause harm; lack
of care or diligence is sufficient. Furthermore, there are many cases of
strict liability. Besides that, vicarious liability is also accepted, which is not
the case in criminal liability.
Another interesting difference in relation to criminal responsibility is that
there is no restriction in the civil sphere in trying legal entities. In Brazil,
criminal responsibility of legal entities is confined to cases expressly
specified in the law, which is not what happens with the crimes of racism
and racial slander. An interesting piece of data is that of the civil suits tried
by TJSP that we analyzed; several such suits were filed against legal
entities.
It is also worth noting that civil responsibility can have a punitive
character, which is something we also found in the TJSP decisions. As
mentioned, the legalist strategy impedes or makes it difficult to address and
explore alternative means of articulating legal avenues for trying such
cases.
Laws are applied in specific ways that must be taken into consideration
for such an articulation to take place. These specific characteristics are
related to the circumstances of the concrete cases and to the relation
between the normative text in question and all other existing texts in the
legal system. The competent authority whose task it is to apply the law
should take into consideration the specificities of the case and try to
understand the norms systematically, relating them to each other. 51
Obviously, if the perfect coincidence between the legal text and the result of
the application process is a chimera, one can talk about the need for certain
congruence even if the judiciary does not take a literal stance. Such
congruence is essential, because authorities cannot simply ignore the
norm's text and try cases without parameters.
The problem is that the lack of criminal convictions for racism is
perceived by the social movements as a failure of the judiciary to apply the
law independently of the internal dynamic evidenced by our research-that
51. There is not enough space to delve into this issue, but it should be noted that the
process by which a norm is "elected" can often be described as an activity of "construction"
because the normative material does not always make clear the rules to be applied. A vast
array of statutes and other sets of norms have to be set forth in order to formulate an
intelligible legal proposition. For a didactic description and complete discussion of this
process, see KARL ENGICH, INTRODUCAO AO PENSAMENTO JURiDICO (J. Baptista Machado
trans., Fundaqfo Calouste Gulbenkian, 6th ed. 1988).
Ronald Dworkin explicitly
characterizes the legal argument as constructive. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 52-54, 336, 423 (1986).
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is, independently of the dispute over the meaning of the legal norms being
applied and of the problematic incidence of specific penal procedures,
which only became apparent after close examination of the way the laws
were applied. 52 The general evaluation of the way the court has been
applying antiracism legislation does not take into consideration the specific
legal dogmatic circumstances of criminal law. As we have seen, the law's
enforcer has to deal with a whole series of categories ("racism," "racial
injury," legality, specialty, and ne bis in idem), which increases the
possibilities of interpretation, thereby increasing the indeterminacy of the
norms.
As shown, the introduction of the category of "racial slander" through a
new statute has not reduced the room for interpretation, as hoped.
Furthermore, it was only through the reconstructing of the act of
application, the procedural problem of the expiration of the period for the
victim to bring the case before the court, that the main reason for the
premature termination of cases became apparent. This fact allows us to say
that the creation of a new statute does not necessarily eliminate the
possibility of multiple interpretations, and it also throws light on the
importance of the internal dynamics of the judiciary's power.
CONCLUSION
The evidence gathered in this essay allows us to conclude that, even
considering the legal dogmatic difficulties that lead to a low conviction rate,
the Brazilian judiciary is not indifferent to racism, at least in the country's
most rich and populated state, Sdo Paulo. The majority of the judicial
decisions of the So Paulo Court of Appeals that we researched
acknowledged that racism is illegal and that the incidences of such acts
must be curtailed, even when not by means of enforcing the crime of
racism. Such an acknowledgement makes it possible to go beyond a
pessimistic and generalized outlook in which judges are racist or our
judiciary is insensitive to the fight for equality, and to investigate further the
very elements within the system that contribute to the absence of
satisfactory answers. This recognition permits the development of better
strategies to safeguard one's right to not be discriminated against, including
a strategy directed specifically toward lawyers who bring cases before the
judiciary.
Beyond this, a more general diagnosis of the judiciary's alleged
insensitivity could not be restricted to criminal issues, a concept that has
been the main strategy in the discourse of the African-Brazilian movement.

52. It is worth emphasizing that we are not discussing the social effectiveness of the
law-that is, its real effects in society-because such a concept would demand the
verification of not only the rulings, but also of whether the response of the judiciary actually
changed the situation in society. We are only debating whether the judiciary, or more
specifically, So Paulo's judiciary, has been sensitive to the question of racism in its
application of the law.
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The civil cases should also be included, as well as others we did not include
in this study.
It is worth emphasizing that the evidence found shows that, in terms of
civil responsibility, there are nowadays lawyers working to obtain antiracist
results from laws that were not specifically construed to deal with racial
issues, even though this strategy does not appear in the discourse of the
African-Brazilian movement. Possibilities such as these, which can be
applied to other areas, such as work relations, reveal the importance of the
room for arguing about the meaning of legal norms and the important role
of lawyers in actively pursuing this process.
As we have already shown, in terms of penal legislation, the data
confirms that the judiciary does not consider such discriminatory acts as
legally irrelevant. A significant problem was the creation of the crime of
racial slander without allowing the district attorney to initiate the criminal
procedure, instead leaving the victim to initiate the case. In a large number
of cases, the court's ruling in favor of racial slander is justifiable from an
internal legal standpoint. The practical, undesirable result of this type of
decision cannot be evaluated without taking into consideration the
procedural problems we have outlined, which indicate that the creation of a
specific statute resulted in further complexity without solving the problem it
set out to solve. In terms of the current situation, it seems that, in this case,
a statute for solving the problem of duplicity of procedures could avoid the
early termination of cases by eliminating the difficulty arising from the
victim's failure to comply with deadlines.
A discussion of the juridification of racism cannot be reduced to the
concern over criminal condemnations. Whatever the strategy adopted, if it
is dependent on the application of legal norms-by a judge or other
authorities-it will not avoid the question of incongruence between the
norm and its application.
This implies that any social movement
developing a legal strategy must take legal dogmatics into consideration. In
other words, it must take part in the debate over how to establish the
meaning of the norm. Ignoring this problem can be dangerous to
democracy.
At the very least, the defense of legalism as the suppression of the
judge's freedom and the complete elimination of the possibility to interpret
laws constitute an authoritarian strategy that controls the judiciary and
constitutes a threat to its sovereignty. Of course, a radical position like that
appeared only in fascist regimes. Nevertheless, there is an antidemocratic
bias in ignoring the inner dynamics of the application of norms, even if only
an unconscious one.
An independent judiciary should be able to interpret, for itself, public
opinion. 53 Historically, the judiciary has severed ties to the Executive
power and this has guaranteed that judges cannot be arbitrarily removed
53. See OTro

KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR

POLITICAL ENDS 186 (1961).
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from their posts-a process that consolidated the judiciary into an
in
independent political player, whose decisions cannot be subordinated
54
administrative terms, neither to the Executive nor to the legislature.
In its separation from the Executive, the judiciary establishes a direct
relationship with society. Its foundation of legitimacy is public opinion, not
orders that come from another superior power. The judiciary solves the
conflicts that come before it independently according to the law it deems
best to apply to each case. For this reason, the corollary of judicial
independence is the indetermination of the law-the impossibility of
predicting a solution to be applied to a conflict. 55 An independent court is
one in which the plaintiff does not know what to expect and in which an
element of risk faces the accuser. Indetermination, from the judge's point
of view, best describes the process of choosing the appropriate norms for
the case as well as how to interpret those norms.
The freedom to interpret and apply legal norms is current in various
western legal systems. No one asks the plaintiff what legal rules should be
applied to the case at hand (jura novit curia); the court is obliged to know
the applicable law, which means that the court has the power to determine
independently what rule should be applied to the case. Such a possibility
allows the judge to rule not only in light of the affected parties, but also to
consider the interests of third parties or society as a whole, as long as they
can be founded in legal norms. Concomitant with the freedom of the courts
is the duty to justify rulings or, rather, to make clear the reasons behind
rulings. Such decisions are addressed directly by the litigating parties, but
are also directed at the public sphere, which is interested in a judiciary that
treats similar cases in a similar way and protects both third-party and
societal interests by applying legal principals and rules.
Some aspects of the repression of the judiciary's freedom clearly show
the atrophy of the justification of judicial decisions in authoritarian regimes
and the centrality of this characteristic in defining modem Western courts.
According to Otto Kirchheimer, authoritarian regimes prohibit the
development of private commentaries made on laws, tantamount to
prohibiting the development of extraofficial doctrines. In the German
Democratic Republic, for example, there was an official legal journal in
which lawyers associated with the regime outlined decisions every lawyer
and judge had to follow.5 6 Furthermore, the legal profession lacked
prestige and the lawyer's role as representative of specific social demands
was repressed. 57 The whole system was set up so that the government's
reasons were faithfully passed on to the judge to suppress her power to
interpret and apply the law. 58 The "justification" of the decision was
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 18, 186.
See id. at 426.
See id. at 269.
See id. at 274.
See FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL
SOCIALISM, 1933-1944, at 453-54, 630-32 (Octagon Books 1963) (1942); FRANZ NEUMANN,
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already contained within the government's dictate, and the court's job was
not to convince the general public, but to reaffirm sovereign authority. The
judge, if he or she failed to follow governmental decrees, could be removed;
59
such was the almost nonexistent level of his or her freedom.
These observations allow us to point to the importance of clearly
distinguishing between legalist positions that perceive interpretation as
something untoward, and literalist positions that recognize the existence of
a space for interpretation but defend that judges should adopt a particular
way of exercising their power. The lawyer who advocates for the creation
of certain rights in spite of a lack of specific legislation plays an important
role in interpreting existing laws. The suppression of the indeterminacy of
law, as we have already shown, is also the suppression of the judge's and
the lawyer's freedom to act, and favors the creation of a centralized power
base for interpreting existing laws.

294-96
(1986).
59. Recent research shows that, even in authoritarian regimes, courts can be relatively
THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN MODERN SOCIETY

autonomous:

Even when courts are used for social control, they vary a good deal in the extent to
which they enjoy real autonomy. Stalinist show trials-though a tiny part of the
criminal caseload of Soviet judges-utilized courts for political education and the
statement of regime policies, employing the form of law without any autonomy
given to courts. But other regimes may be less willing or able to dictate outcomes
in individual cases. One might categorize the levels of autonomy of courts
involved in implementing regime policies, ranging from pure instruments in which
outcomes and punishment are foreordained to situations of relative autonomy in
which courts can find defendants innocent.
Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian
Politics,in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4 (Tom

Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).

